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ABSTRACT 
The article deals with the phenomenon of epistemic communities. The concept was coined by P. Haas in the late XX 
century in an attempt to analyze functions and political prospects of expert and professional knowledge in the modern 
knowledge-based society. The concept has been widely used during the recent decades in sociology of knowledge, policy 
studies and social philosophy. Despite the fact that some scholars voiced a number of critical remarks, no (or very few) 
attempts to rethink the concept of epistemic communities have been made. The article gives a review of research into 
epistemic communities and introduces the concept of epistemic operating mode in order to rethink the concept and clear up 
operational mechanisms of epistemic communities as a specific form of knowledge (expert) communities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of epistemic communities was developed by P. Haas in the late XX century to explain how decision-makers 
and politicians interact with scientific and/or professional communities when challenged with global problems that require 
expert consulting. E. Haas and E. Adler also significantly contributed to the concept formation. 
The concept of epistemic communities suggests that the latter share ideas and resources to promote their ideas (their 
resources can include political influence or academic reputation). Moreover, any epistemic community combines political 
initiative with scientific objectivity. This makes epistemic communities different from NGOs, advocacy coalitions, interest 
groups, etc. The concept has been used widely during the recent decades in sociology of knowledge, policy studies and 
social philosophy, mainly in various case studies. 
The earliest attempts to sum up the research materials date back to the first decade of the ХХI century. In 2012, a review 
article «Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later» by M. D. Cross was published. The survey of both the last-
century and latest research papers gives an idea of how the concept has evolved and admits the necessity to 
reconceptualize it. Cross‟s innovation is expanding the concept by including non-scientific/non-expert knowledge into the 
domain of epistemic communities. This is probably the most cover-all article on the matter. Some others, which are touched 
upon in this article, try to refine the concept in other ways. But these attempts are rather scarce. And some questions are 
still to be answered – or answered on a renewed theoretical basis. First of all, it is the question of defining epistemic 
communities‟ boundaries: how can one differentiate between epistemic and other communities? Another disputable 
question is whether epistemic communities have easily definable limits of political independence. 
The concept of espistemic communities requires re-interpetatitg with regard to the above-mentioned challenges. 
The given article suggests the concept of «epistemic operating mode», which is intended to clear up the matter of defining 
epistemic communities‟ functional boundaries and eliminates some contradictions, which inevitably emerge when epistemic 
communities are considered to be a permanent structure, not a mode in which an expert community is functioning under 
certain conditions. 
1. THE FORMING OF THE EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY CONCEPT 
The concept of epistemic community in its current meaning was formed in the late ХХ century (the 90-s) by E. Haas, P. 
Haas, and E. Adler. However, the idea that knowledge-based communities are of political importance had been developed 
earlier, in the 70-s and 80-s.  
The concept of epistemic community takes its origin in the «episteme» concept. The latter was widely used by M. Foucault. 
In 1975, J. Ruggie introduced the term «epistemic community» with the reference to Foucault [1]. 
In the course of time, the concept grew more and more policy-oriented. However, in the 80-s the term «epistemic 
community» still had various interpretations. E. Haas and P. Haas followed J. H. Marx and B. Holzner who defined 
epistemic communities as «those knowledge-oriented work communities in which cultural standards and social 
arrangements interpenetrate around a primary commitment to epistemic criteria in knowable production and application» 
[2]. 
E. Haas expanded this definition and included into the list of basic characteristics of epistemic communities adherence to 
certain shared values and political initiative. In 1989, P. Haas analyzed factors underlying the success of the so-called 
Mediterranean Plan. He found that it had succeded due to engaging scientists, marine biologists, ecologists (members of 
an epistemic community) in the agenda-forming [3].  
In 1992, Haas gave his own interpretation of the epistemic community concept in the «Introduction: Epistemic communities 
and International Policy Coordination». Today, it is the most widely-recognized (and widely discussed) definition of 
epistemic communities [4]. According to it, epistemic communities have four following features: 
«1)  a shared set of normative and principled beliefs which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of 
community members; 
2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of 
problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiples linkages between possible policy 
actions and desired outcomes; 
3) shared notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighting and validating knowledge in the 
domain of their expertise; 
4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a 
consequence» [4]. 
Besides, P. Haas and E. Adler analyzed the role of epistemic communities in establishing a new world regime. Unlike some 
of their followers, Adler and Haas considered epistemic communities to be a kind of interpretative filter for political choices 
rather than a new political actor.  
Highly illustrative are two works by Haas and Adler, «Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect 
Stratospheric Ozone» (1992) [5] and «The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the 
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International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control» (1992) [6]. The first article presents research into activities of a 
transnational environmental epistemic community. It made a theoretical basis for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer. The second article analyzes how the idea of global nuclear disarmament evolved in the political 
interaction between the Soviet Union and the USA which resulted in the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in 1972. 
(This research was carried further by М. Dover in 2013 in an article on international cooperation between the USA and the 
Russian Federation in the field of nuclear weapon  non-proliferation in the last decade of the 20
th
 century) [7]). 
Also, Haas and Adler made a hypothese that epistemic communities are able to help establish a new alternative world 
regime without hegemons [8]. This theory can come true only under a number of conditions. The scholars made it clear that 
effectiveness and succes of this alternative global regime depends on the extent in which it is based on shared values of 
the humanity, not individual states. It is self-evident that this is the highest goal to strive, which, however, cannot be 
achieved by formal procedures only. 
The above-mentioned works resulted in a commomly recognized and shared by numerous scholars interpretation of 
epistemic community. Haas‟ vision of the phenomenon formed a basis for further research in the field of politics, social 
studies etc. Today, scholars strictly follow Haas when defining epistemic communities.  
For example, K. Lynch defines epistemic communities as follows: “groups of individuals sharing a particular interest or 
expertise who are able to exercise a high degree of influence over the shaping of various public policy issues based on a 
common interest” [9, 94-95]. P. Harris defines them as “specialist communities who often form international networks on a 
certain issue or type of knowledge” [10, 87]. In more recent discussions of epistemic communities Antoniades gives them 
the following definition: “socially recognized knowledge-based networks, the members of which share a common 
understanding of a particular problem/issue or a common worldview and seek to translate their beliefs into dominant social 
discourse and social practice” [11, 26], whereas K. Suzuki states that «members of an epistemic community distinctively 
act on a value-based rationale, shared methods and criteria of analyzing, validating and linking problems and desired 
outcomes, and have common practices in their exercise of competence” [12, 17]. Undoubtedly, the scholars use Haas‟ 
ideas as a basis for their vision of the phenomenon. 
Although the concept has made its way into policy and social studies, it is not widely represented in theoretical, conceptual 
works. It is used in case studies, predominantly in such fields of research as health (Z. Heritage, J. Green, J. McGivern), 
environment protection (S. Murphy, K. Rosendal), economics (W. Drake, E. Karayannis), intellectual property (L. Dobush, S. 
Quak), etc. Works on Asia-Pacific are focused on regional security and economic development (J. Dosch, М. Mols, C. Dent, 
J. Rueland, M. Schreus, etc.). 
Here is a brief overview of the recent research into epistemic communities. 
Z. Heritage and J. Green analyze activities of a transnational health epistemic community. According to the scholars, the 
community significantly contributed into the building of the European national networks «Health City» in 2003-2008 [13]. S. 
Sturdy, R. Freeman and J. Smith-Merry cover a wider chronological scope by studying activities of the World Health 
Organization from the 70-s to today [14]. The concept of epistemic communities made a theoretical basis for an article by A. 
Balch‟s on migration policy of Great Britain in the first decade of the XXI century [15]. 
Informal links among epistemic comnmunities‟ members contribute into consensus-building among decision-makers. Not 
only do they provide expert knowledge, but also act as an intermediary. R. Tiller, T. Brekken, J. Baily highlight the 
intermediary function when analyzing political processes in integrated management of coastal aquacultures in Norway. 
Despite the fact that epistemic communities are underdeveloped there, the scholars hope that their emergence could 
prevent conflicts in this field [16]. However, it is difficult to measure how influential epistemic communities can be. D. J. 
Galbreath and J. McEvoy were challenged with this problem when trying to clear up the role of epistemic communities in 
the EU policy concerning minorities [17].  
L. Dobush and S. Quack analyze the case of «Creative Commons», a non-profit organization which addresses intellectual 
property issues [18]. They regard it as a politically successful epistemic community of lawyers. But their success is 
accounted to activities going far beyond the limits of an epistemic community. In fact, the «Creative Commons» acted as a 
social movement because interpretative functions of epistemic communities were obviously insufficient. I. Rossi considers 
the  community of Linux developers to be epistemic, too [19]. This community is a community of software developers, 
active professionally and politically. Lust like «Creative Commons», they use a wider range of instruments than epistemic 
communities as they were described by Haas. The tendency to reformulate the concept may be explained by the scholars‟ 
doubt in political efficiency of pure expert knowledge. 
It is to note that there are very few attempts to theoretically expand or rethink the concept. Among them are ideas of K. 
Bukhari, who, in search for theoretical foundations, pointed out that constructivism, with its vision of scientific knowledge as 
a socially constructed phenomenon, perfectly correlating with the epistemic community concept [20]. K. Dunlop proposes 
another interesting approach to epistemic communities. She lists epistemic communities as one of the key paradigms used 
to analyze political learning. Epistemic learning, i. e. learning through epistemic actors, experts, suggests that epistemic 
communities act as tutors of a kind. However, it is their “students” – decision-makers – that direct the process of learning by 
selecting prioritized knowledge fields and issues to debate [21]. 
Probably, the most remarkable theoretical all-emrbacing work is the above-mentioned article by M. D. Cross «Rethinking 
epistemic communities twenty years later». According to Cross, the concept requires further conceptual development. Her 
own idea is that international epistemic communities should not be limited to scientific ones, that is, their knowledge should 
not be limited to scientific data  [22]. M. Meyer and S. Molyneux-Hogson also reviewed and summed up existing variants of 
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the concept. As many before them, they pointed out that they do not fully explain how epistemic communities form and 
function [23]. 
It is to be concluded that epistemic communities are currently under research, but most of the scholars follow Haas‟ 
definition and highlight two crucial features of epistemic communities: their political potential and shared knowledge and 
values of their members. The vast majority of works dedicated to epistemic communities are case studies which provide 
diverse examples but do not rethink or reinterpretate the concept itself, with some rare exceptions. However, the concept of 
epistemic comminities needs refining (if not redefining).  
2. KNOWLEDGE AS SOCIAL POWER OR DISCOURSE OF POWER 
Knowledge is of special importance in a society faced with high uncertainty and unpredictable risks in decision-making. The 
modern knowledge-based society combines high technological and environmental risks with a knowledge basis comprised 
of unprecedentedly diverse scientific data – ironically, science both generates risks and is required to eliminate them. This 
dualism has been pointed out by G. Bechmann, according to whom, the contemporary society is differentiated from the 
previous stages of social development by its ways of addressing global uncertainty. The society does it by regarding its 
own future as a kind of risk. In fact, risk is the necessity to make decisions in the context of high uncertainty [24].  
In the broad context of information society studies it is important to take into account the role of goal-setting subjects of 
knowledge (groups and individuals) in this society. The phenomenon of epistemic communities is interlinked with the 
process when scientists do not just serve the interests of economic and political actors but also try to solve global 
problems. Under these conditions, scientists do not just seek new knowlege and, consequently, the truth, which is the 
essence of scientific cognition. While considering the truth to be the highest value, they are also able to use their shared 
vision of the truth (knowledge) to address global political and economic issues.  
The Pugwash Movement, which was founded in 1955 by a group prominent scientist, can serve as an example of such 
community. The Movement positions itself as a community of technical experts engaged in policy-oriented studies in the 
field of international security and arms control. 
In the modern knowledge-based society it is crucial for scientists to understand which criteria can be used to justify their 
theories, because their object of cognition are not natural objects but technical/sociotechnical objects and developments.  
Importantly and predictably, an emerging «knowledge economy» (or «innovative economy») results in increasing influence 
of scientists – bearers of domain-specific, predominantly scientific knowledge. The influence manifests itself in all social 
spheres: politics, culture, everyday life. As a rule, these recommendations are collective. In  other words, they express a 
shared epistemic (knowledge-based) position of a certain scientific community.  
The tendency to rely upon integrated expert knowledge for (predominantly) political and economic decision-making is a 
kind of modern innovation in itself. First of all, this tendency means that it s possible to integrate knowledge of various 
specialists (scientists) and obtain new knowledge which is shared by all scientists but does not belong to any scientist as 
an individual. That is why it is necessary to differentiate the competence of a individual expert, which is as old as human 
civilization, from the competence of an expert group, a community of specialists capable of proposing collective solutions. 
Special methods are required to obtain such shared knowledge. A popular method of polling scientist has been known 
since the 60
th
 of the ХХ century under the name «Delphi method». There is no reason to apply expert polls in highly 
specialized fields of knowledge which require experimental proof. Knowledge integration becomes useful when knowledge 
is a «direct productive force» and, when practically applied, leads to significant economic, political and social changes.  
That is why knowledge integration and expert evaluation are usually required at the conceptual (empirically non-verifiable) 
level and to forecast development of technical systems, weapons, climate changes, social institutions, on one hand, and 
deveop scenarios of multi-level social subjects‟ actions, on the other.  
Epistemic communities emerge to meet the challenge of global uncertainty. The reasons for involving epistemic 
communities into policy-making were roughly analyzed by P. Haas, who wrote that decision makers turn to epistemic 
communities for them to make a forecast, predict possible outcomes of a certain political course, help form it [4].  
Strictly speaking, these are rather expectations than reasons. Politicians seek expert help in decision-making, but why do 
politicians believe that experts are able to help them? It is not only because they need information due to high uncertainty. 
It is also because scientific and expert knowledge are expected to have some ethical basis and be oriented at the global 
common good, human welfare. Or, at the very least, policy-makers use the concept of ethically concerned scientific 
knowledge to legitimize their actions. Even so, ethical foundations of knowedge usage are typical of this concept of science. 
Expert – and epistemic – communities are regarded as a linkage between policy anf science. As such, they have some 
specific power. 
The idea of viewing epistemic communities as bearers of specific power first emerged in the works by M. Foucault in the 
context of his concept of discourse power [25]. In the frame of this concept power is regarded as a kind of discourse and an 
instinctive social power. This power does not belong to anyone, being an integrative factor for social groups, but it can be 
consolidated in the hands of an individual or some institution. Foucault revealed the mechanism of aquiring social power 
through the order of discourse (through the right to legitimize differences).  
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Although Foucault did not analyze the phenomenon of epistemic communities in itself, it is impossible to understand the 
principles of their forming without understanding the idea of discourse power. It is neither knowledge itself that has power, 
nor an individual who owns this knowledge. It is the discursive order which this knowledge (and individuals who own it) can 
make legitimate. The knowledge which has power is a kind of knowledge expressed in the text of an instruction or a 
decree, in a state program, a financial code and directly in legislation. In the modern world fight for power is predominantly 
a fight for the way of describing (discourse) of human and social reality.  
In the frame of this approach, science is regarded as a kind of discourse, along with the discourse of religion, art, 
journalistics, etc.. A full range of consequences of science transformation into a kind of dicourse is presented in a widely 
recognized work by J.-F. Lyotard «The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge» [26]. Of great importance is the 
implication that knowledge cannot gain power if it skips the stage of becoming the language of a certain community: at first 
– scientists, later – well-educated people, at last – politicians or decision-makers. After twenty five years the concept of 
discourse power becomes a theoretical foundation and ideological justification of the so-called «soft power» policy (see J. 
Nye for «soft power») [27]. 
The phenomenon of epistemic communities is interlinked with the process when scientists do not just serve the interests of 
economic and political actors but also try to solve global problems. Under these conditions, scientists do not just seek new 
knowlege and, consequently, the truth, which is the essence of scientific cognition. While considering  truth to be the 
highest value, they are also able to use their shared vision of the truth (knowledge) to address global political and economic 
issues. 
Epistemic communities are also expected to provide communicative environment for science, society and political 
processes. Globalization – in addition to scientific progress – makes risks increasingly high, due to which expert knowledge 
becomes unprecedentedly valuable. At the same time, globalization creates a special informational environment which is 
perfect for knowledge dissemination. At the same time, globalization sets a limit on governments‟ ability to cope with 
economical, financial, environmental processes which affect the humanity across territorial borders. No state can 
successfully cope on its own with international crime, epidemics or climate changes. Epistemic communities act as agents 
of globalization by providing a platform for multi-lateral dialogues of various actors: governments, enterprises, NGOs, etc. 
[28]. 
The necessity to forecast consequences of certain decisions, develope alternative scenarios and help form a consensual 
position of all participants of any multilateral project is typical of innovative knowledge-based economy. We believe that the 
epistemic discourse correlates with the prognostic function of scientific cognition. Since epistemic communities are to meet 
this challenge, their major activity is foresight. Foresight proceeds from an assumption that the desired future can be made 
true by coordinated efforts only. Literally, foresight does not answer the question: “What will happen?”. It answers the 
question: “What should be done for something to happen?”.  Foresight is used to influence upon future, to form it, not just to 
predict it. Prognosis is just a component of foresight [29]. This accounts for a significant specific feature of foresight (and 
epistemic communities): tendency to involve decision-makers at all stages of development. 
3. POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES: CRITICS AND 
DEBATES 
The concept of epistemic communities, despite its wide usage, provokes critics when applied to international policy 
coordination as its only explanation.  
As early as 1992 J. Sebenius made some critical remarks to Haas‟ works by pointing out that mechanisms of transforming 
values and ideas into political power were not properly explained [30]. Nearly a decade later A. Mooney and B. Evans 
voiced similar critics. They doubted that epistemic communities always have access to political agenda [31]. Epistemic 
communities cannot exist without direct links to politicians, and P. Haas underlined this fact: epistemic communities are 
neither scientific nor political groups. That is why some scholars, for example, J. Peel, claim that institutionalization of 
epistemic communities is vitally important for their efficiency [32].  
Of course, it is commonly accepted that the process of institutionalization can transform an epistemic community into some 
kind of interest group or avocacy coalition which acts to benefit governments or corporations. In this case no independence 
is possible. Some scholars are much more optimistic, however. For example, M. Sundstroem suggests that international 
epistemic communities can influence national experts so effectively that the latter develop a shared vision of current global 
problems at the national level and tend to arrive at an international agreement easier [33].  
Of much interest is D. Toke‟s critics of the epistemic community concept. He «accused» Haas of underestimating influence 
of interest groups [34]. K. Litfin and G. Kuetting provided some critics, too. Liftin analyzed the process of the Montreal 
Protocole in 1987 and admitted that scientists played an important role in developing political agreement. However, she 
pointed out that the epistemic communities approach simply underestimated how often scientific data were used just for the 
legitimization of current policy courses  [35]. G. Kuetting claimed Haas‟ statement that epistemic communities played the 
decisive role in forming the Mediterranean Plan has no foundations [36].  
The above-described critics make one think about how epistemic communities (knowledge) interact with decision makers 
(power) in general. Scholars have not arrived at an agreement in this question yet. Their opinions range from very 
optimistic to highly pessimistic, which is due to the fact that the researchers judge by the result of their case studies, too 
narrow and specific to cover a wider area. 
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Thus, J. McGivern presented an example of an effective epistemic community without actual governmental support: the 
multidisciplinary biomedicine network «University Genetics Knowledge Park» made to transfer scientific data into the British 
health system. McGivern tracked key stages of this process and described interaction between the epistemic community 
and other actors. Strictly speaking, the network was initiated by the government. But the latter failed to control it and cut the 
financing. In spite of this, the data provided by the experts found its way into the health system [37]. On the contrary, K. 
Dunlop described a totally different case by comparing two scientific groups which worked in he EU as two types of 
epistemic community. The groups addressed the issue of the growth hormone. One was government-initiated, the other 
formed evolutionally. Dunlop came to a conclusion that decision makers cannot delegate their power to an independent 
epistemic community, so they tend to establish their own communities by recruiting experts [38]. This conclusion 
undermines the idea of an independent and yet influential epistemic community. This is no exception. Sometimes scholars, 
such as M. King, regard epistemic communities‟ success as a result of mere coincidence of their goals with the goals of 
decision-makers [39]. However, some researchers (for example, the above-mentioned Heritage and Green) regard 
governmentally initiated epistemic communities as quite normal and effective. 
We think that this dispute can be productive in the context of individual case studies only. Contemporary political practices 
provide so controversial data on epistemic communities‟ efficiency that no generalistic approach is suitable. 
4. DEFINING BOUNDARIES OF EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES: FROM EXPERT TO 
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES 
The problem of defining boundaries of epistemic communities is especially difficult. They do not have a strict structure and, 
just like an «invisible college», can include members of various organizations: scientists, researchers, politicians, 
governmental officials, etc. However, no epistemic community can be fully integrated into governmental structures or 
corporations. Within an epistemic community only horizontal links can be effective, due to its network-like structure. In other 
words, any epistemic community, with its interdisciplinairy and absence of a formal leader, can be described as a network 
with a number of local “centers”. It makes them different from other forms of knowledge organization, such as laboratories, 
think collectives, etc. 
Epistemic communities should be distinguished from bureaucracy and interest groups. Interest groups usually promote 
views of a certain coalition. It is not their values and beliefs that urge their members to intervene with policy-making 
processes. Thus, an epistemic community can include scientists, researchers, interest group analysts and public officials, 
often operating in a private capacity, but it is more than just a scientific, political or interest group. Also, disputable is the 
question whether non-governmental organizations belong to epistemic communities. 
P. Haas was the first to try to differentiate between epistemic communities and other groups of the kind. He made up two 
schemes to illustrate the differences using two differentiating criteria: 1) shared causal beliefs; 2) knowledge basis of a 
certain type. Later, epistemic communities have been compared to various structures: policy communities or policy transfer 
networks (М. Evans, J. Davis), NGOs (J. Braithwaite, P. Drahos, K. Gough), discourse coalitions (K. Litfin). It is quite 
obvious that all these groups and communities can be compared to epistemic ones from the standpoint of their functional 
and structural characteristics. But they do not form the basis for epistemic communities. Expert groups do – to some extent. 
Epistemic communities can be viewed as a specific form of scientific community, because any cognitive activity is collective 
(meaning “live” knowledge exchange). The forming of increasingly broader scientific communities can be traced back to 
antiquity, when these communities were limited to scientific schools [40]. Later, professional communities (and universities) 
emerged. Expert communities emerged no earlier than in the ХХ
th
 century. It is not the final stage, though. Today expert 
communities can only be understood in the context of the forming of broader communities – epistemic ones. This historical 
sequence can be imagined as building one integration level over another. Expert communities are based on professional 
ones, professional communities stem from scientific schools. 
Expert knowledge differs from classical scientific knowledge by its structure. It is required to use integrated expert 
knowedge to solve strategic economic and political problems. However, a paradox emerges: knowledge of physics, 
psycology, economics, etc. as separated fields od expertise looses its social (innovative) importance. Scientific knowledge 
becomes a political and economic power only in its systems, integrated and, to a great extent, interdisciplinary form. Expert 
knowledge is differentiated from scientific knowledge by its subject. While the latter studies real objects, expert knowledge 
deals with tendencies and foresight, in other words, non-existing or virtual objects. Therefore, expert knowledge is 
predominantly applicable to future scenarios developing (foresight).  
The different ways of functioning of scientific and expert knowledge are the key to understanding the forming factors of 
expert communities, decision-making processes and politically or economically relevant recommendations, as well as to 
understanding the reason why any major organization – an industrial corporation, public authorities or international 
organizations like APEC – have to rely upon trust expert evaluations and form expert groups.  
The crucial difference between epistemic communities and expert groups is that the latter play a passive instrumental role. 
They are bearers of tacit knowledge which can be revealed by a special method – expert polls. Delphi method suggests 
that experts are independent from each other, or (which is better) do not know each other at all. On the contrary, an 
epistemic position of an expert is personal and value-based. 
Today, we have an opportunity to deeper understand the role of expert communities – mostly due to the fact that we can 
view them from the standpoint of a relatively new phenomenon of self-organized expert groups which can be subjects of 
their knowledge, or, in other words, apply their knowledge to political and economic decision-making. Such self-organized 
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expert communities are capable of promoting this or that economic/political decision based on their shared vision of the 
true and the right. This means they are epistemic by their shared values.  
Epistemic communities can be based on expert ones, being a higher level of their development  to the extent in which they 
take human well-being into account. However, one cannot say that an expert community ends where an epistemic one 
begins. It is not a direct, historically retraceble sequence. The main reason for that is that any epistemic community is not 
an institution. It is a process of a kind, a state of mind which is enabled but a number of factors including human factor. An 
expert community can act as an epistemic one, which means, it is an epistemic community under current conditions. 
4. EPISTEMIC OPERATING MODE  
Epistemic communities do not have strictly defined boundaries. On one hand, thay can be regarded as a higher level of 
expert knowledge integration and development (compared to expert communities). But an epistemic community does not 
remain active forever. A. Antoniades reasonably divided epistemic communities into two categories: ad-hoc coalitions and 
permanent coalitions [11]. Ad-hoc coalitions are established to solve a certain political problem. Permanent global groups 
are aimed at promoting their ideas and beliefs as the dominant social discourse.  
However, this distinction seems to be irrelevant when it comes to the major defining feature of epistemic communities: they 
believe that addressing global issues is an urgent necessity. In our understanding, which is rather close to the initial 
concept developed by Haas, a community is epistemic when it meets this criterion and, as a result, has some political 
initiative. No community can comply with this requirement at all times, so we propose the following idea. Any international 
expert (scientific) community can operate in different modes: as an interdisciplinary scientific community united by a 
common problem to solve; as an expert community given a task by some institution or government;  as an epistemic 
community promoting its shared knowledge to help solve global problems.  
That is why research should be done into ways of epistemic communities‟ functioning, their operating mode. In this paper, it 
is suggested to regard any knowledge-based community from the standpoint of its specific operating mode which can be 
defined as epistemic operating mode. 
Epistemic mode can be estimated with the help of characteristics given below. 
1) Self-organization. Members of an «ideal» epistemic community act on their own initiative and cannot be recruited by 
governments or corporations to make their policy legitimate. However, grants or contracts do not make epistemic mode 
wholly impossible. Expert groups of international organizations or members of international projects can swith to the 
epistemic mode, being partly self-organizing. 
2) Scientific truth as a shared value. No personal interest can be taken into account. Search for political compromise does 
not necessarily deny search for the truth. But it remarkably changes the operating mode of a community. 
3) Personal position of any expert member of the community, which basically means that experts willingly take personal 
responsibility for their recommendations. 
4) Adherence to shared values. A community working in the epistemic mode has a common system of values. On the 
contrary, a distinctly neutral (ethically) position of experts indicates that their community is not epistemic.  
5) Political influence. Epistemic mode requires significant political influence which can be ensured by engaging decision-
makers (politicians, investors). 
5) Interdisciplinarity. In many cases, it ensures that projects under discussion can be realized. Therefore, high level of 
interdisciplinarity indicated epistemic mode. Strictly theoretical problems limited by a single discipline makes operating in 
this mode impossible. 
6) Focus on global problems which affect human development, well-being, security. Such activities as foresight, scenarios 
of possible future variants are indicative. Epistemic communities seldom focus on solving problems which do not have any 
long-term consequences. When most of these features are undoubtedly seen in the activity of a certain international 
scientific community, this community can be regarded as epistemic – which means, acting in the epistemic mode. 
6. CONCLUSION  
It is to note that any knowledge-based community can be characterized with the help of these criteria. They allow to define 
when and under what conditions it functioned in the epistemic mode. This approach explains many противоречия of 
existing concepts. They can also be used in developing measures to initiate  epistemically functioning communities or 
switch existing expert groups into this mode. 
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